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Abstract
This paper aims at determining whether economic, financial and monetary integration on the one
hand, and institutional factors on the other, may have led to gradual convergence in key fiscal
variables across the euro area over the recent period, bringing fiscal positions closer together.
The Maastricht convergence criteria have facilitated this process but we investigate here whether
the structural factors bringing fiscal positions closer together have been a feature of European
integration starting already in the 1970s. The alternative scenario is that the euro zone is still
characterised by largely idiosyncratic national fiscal policies.
Over the 1970-1998 period we run contemporaneous cross-correlation, dispersion and
cointegration tests using annual data for government net lending, and total current revenue and
expenditure to uncover common trends, as measures of fiscal convergence. We also investigate
whether the short term fiscal position in a given country shares both a common euro area
component and national features (i.e., idiosyncratic national cycles) using a dynamic factor analysis
on quarterly data for the four largest euro area countries since 1985. We find convincing
evidence that for euro area countries cross-correlation has increased steadily over the sample
period and that fiscal dispersion has been declining at a sustained pace among all countries in the
sample. There is evidence of cointegration across the euro area for several countries on the basis
of total current revenue, and also for total current expenditure. However, when the series are
corrected for the business cycle, cointegration is only accepted for net lending. There is clearly
common fiscal cycles for net lending across the euro area that do not only express common
business cycles.  However, while countries have followed more similar policies in the 1990s in
particular during the run-up to EMU, the timing of fiscal adjustment differed across countries. In
addition, idiosyncratic components still contribute to a significant share of the variability of
individual countries.
JEL Classification:  H60, E61 and C22
Key Words: fiscal policy, euro area, convergence, cointegration, dynamic factor analysisECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 5
1 Introduction
In the transition to the European Monetary Union (EMU), a lot of emphasis has been given to
monetary convergence and the definition of the common monetary policy. Fiscal policy has also
been put under closer scrutiny and a natural question is, therefore, whether the euro-area fiscal
position now has a clear empirical content and significance. This paper aims at determining
whether economic, financial and monetary integration on the one hand, and institutional factors
on the other, have led to convergence in key fiscal variables across the euro area.  The Maastricht
convergence criteria have facilitated this process but we investigate here whether the structural
forces bringing fiscal positions closer together have been a feature of European integration
starting already in the 1970s. The alternative scenario is that the euro zone is still characterised
by largely idiosyncratic national fiscal policies.
There are several empirical investigations examining the extent to which Europe is becoming
more integrated and whether economic developments are becoming more correlated.  Artis and
Zhang (1995 and 1997) find evidence that business cycles are becoming more synchronous
across Europe. Rose (1999) and Frenkel and Rose (1997) find evidence of deepening in trade
intensity across most European countries. Artis and Zhang (1998) find increasing linkage of
interest rates within EMS countries. Angeloni and Dedola (1999) provide evidence that the
monetary policy rules pursued by the central banks of the countries which subsequently adopted
the euro have converged in the run up to EMU.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Eichengreen
and Bayoumi (1997), Krugman (1993), OECD (1999) and several other authors have also
contributed empirically to this debate (albeit with a different focus as their main question is
whether Europe is an optimum currency area).
Against this background, there is instead remarkably little systematic investigation concerning
convergence of key fiscal variables. The main explanation for this gap, that we intend to close in
part, may lie in the fact, that, any research on budgetary policy is plagued by the fact that fiscal
policy is in part exogenous and in part endogenous to the business cycle: by studying fiscal
variables, one would also capture the correlation between business cycles across countries.
Hence, it is not trivial to distinguish between results due to discretionary public finance actions
and results due to the behaviour of the economy. We attempt to reduce this problem by using
cyclically adjusted variables where possible. The approach adopted here is close in spirit to the
various contributions of Artis and Zhang, and Frenkel and Rose.
It is useful at this stage to clarify how we define convergence.1  Given a fiscal variable 
L
W )  in
country i, and 
M
W ) in country j and following Hall et al. (1992 and 1993) and Fuss (1999) the two
variables are converging if the following two complementary conditions are satisfied:
the first condition requires that the expectation of their difference tends to a constant value a
that is small in relative terms (but not necessarily zero), i.e., the variables need not converge
completely to a common value.  The second condition is that the variance of their relationship
also tends to decline reaching a constant value. We check the latter condition by investigation if
the dispersion of these variables declines, or at least does not grow over time.  As noticed by
1 Other definitions of convergence are possible. For example, the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria are different from the definition of
convergence adopted here.  They were cast instead in terms of critical thresholds for the deficit and debt targets  as well as bands for
a set of reference financial variables.  In this case convergence is achieved when these threshold targets, or bands, are met (or in the case
of the debt-ratio have the potential to be met over time). Such a definition of convergence has the appeal of being unequivocal, but does
not consider the dynamics of convergence.
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Hall and Fuss, the second condition is also equivalent to cointegration that aims at detecting
common trends across countries on key fiscal indicators. In the paper, it turns out that fiscal
variables, measured as ratio to GDP, are not mean-reverting and are therefore non-stationary for
the sample we consider, so that cointegration is tested here by means of Equilibrium Correction
Model (ECM) and Johansen cointegration. If b=1, the two variables are said to have converged, or
to exhibit comovements, while the variables are converging if a > 0 and b < 1, or if a < 0 and
b>1 . 2
It is necessary to qualify such a statement since the convergence process may not be continuous
and countries that are converging in the first part of sample may have effectively converged by
the end of the sample period. In such a case of time-varying trends, cointegration would be
rejected for the whole period, but accepted on sub-samples. However, running recursive
cointegration tests appears difficult with annual fiscal data and quarterly fiscal data are not yet
available for all countries in the euro area (and only from 1985 for the largest countries). Hence,
our options are somewhat limited, and we can only test whether countries are converging for
the whole sample period. On the other hand, we can gain some partial insight by investigating
fiscal cycles.
The main contribution of this paper is to seek evidence of gradual convergence in key fiscal
variables from different angles and applying different types of tests and technique. We run cross
correlation, dispersion and cointegration tests using annual data for government net lending, and
total current revenue and expenditure to uncover common trends, as measures of fiscal
convergence. We then concentrate on the largest countries in the euro area that provide reliable
quarterly data and examine whether the short term fiscal position in a given country shares both
euro area components and national features.3 If the euro area fiscal position has an empirical
content one should therefore observe that the common component explains a larger part of the
variance of individual countries than the idiosyncratic or national components. Such a signal
extraction problem can be conveniently solved using the Kalman Filter.
Convergence of fiscal policies seems a reasonable hypothesis for different reasons: first, the euro
area countries have strived to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria and now are
committed to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact; second, budgetary developments trail
economic developments which are becoming increasingly synchronized in the euro area (Artis
and Zhang, and Frenkel and Rose); third, EU countries have initiated a tax harmonisation process,
which is being  fostered by a market-based convergence of tax structures in response to
competitive pressures, as well as, by institutional factors (Mongelli (1997 and 1999) and
references therein); fourth, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary
System exercised a disciplinary effect on participating countries; and fifth in the future euro
area fiscal policies need to be supportive of the objectives of low and stable inflation.
At the same time one must be cautious when applying these concepts to key fiscal indicators, as
euro area governments have historically played different economic and financial roles in the
economy.  For example, some countries have relied on more widespread welfare systems, built
more generous social safety nets (e.g., unemployment benefit payments), and kept larger sections
of their economic system under public sector control than others.  This has in turn required the
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2 Formally, the series have converged and exhibit comovement  or move in a synchronous manner up to a constant a (following some
authors)  if the expectation and the variance of their difference is constant, and not necessarily zero:
and
3 This approach is linked to the analysis of cointegration since the common component may be either a common trend, as in the case of
cointegration (see Harvey, 1989) or a common cycle, if one focuses on stationary variables.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 7
setting up of very different national fiscal structures. Political economy elements were also among
the factors contributing to different budgetary performances (see Buti, Franco and Ongena (1997
and 1998) and references therein). In addition, the underlying European economies are not yet
perfectly integrated. Hence, national fiscal policies of most member countries may not exhibit
comovements  because the shocks hitting them may have still been largely idiosyncratic, or euro
area countries may have responded differently to common shocks (see, inter alia, Bini Smaghi and
Vori (1990), Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993, and Bruneau and De Bandt, 1999).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data and their
univariate time series properties. Section 3 presents several stylised facts on fiscal policies in the
euro area countries using cross correlation indices on cycles and dispersion indicators on the
levels of the variables. These preliminary findings are then completed in the following sections.
Section 4 presents the results of cointegration tests between fiscal indicators across countries.
Section 5 discusses the results of dynamic factor models, in order to assess the relative
importance of common versus idiosyncratic shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data sources and unit root properties
We focus here on three fiscal variables that present complementary facets of fiscal policy: net
lending of the government (NLG), which is a summary variable expressing the balance between
all components of the budget, total current revenue (REV), and total current expenditure (EXP).
While net lending is the most scrutinised fiscal variable  jointly with public debt that is not
discussed here  the other variables are more likely to capture long lasting fiscal co-movements
and eventually gradual convergence of national fiscal policies and structures.4  All variables are
expressed as ratio to GDP, which is a natural normalisation in order to correct, at least partly, for
real and nominal trends in the series. In the remaining of the paper we will only refer to NLG,
REV, and EXP as the corresponding ratio to GDP. For the cointegration analysis we also use the
cyclically adjusted NLG, REV and EXP ratios to secure that we are not capturing only the effect
of real economic convergence. These variables are denoted as NLGQ, REVQ and EXPQ. Due to
the unit elasticity of revenues to GDP, the behaviour of our REV variable is very close to the one
of REVQ. This is not true for government expenditures5.
A crucial aspect of this paper is that the average developments of each variable across the euro
area are taken as a benchmark.  In particular, PPP adjusted GDP values in 1995 are used to
compute such weighted averages. We investigate the comovement and gradual convergence in
fiscal policies  or the lack thereof  with respect to the euro area average for the following
three groups of countries:
1. euro area countries, a group including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain;
2. non-euro area EU countries, a group including the United Kingdom, Sweden and
Greece; and
3. other selected OECD countries, a group including the US, Japan and Canada.
4 Another important variable is government net capital expenditure (CAP), which is the complement to the three other variables, since
NLG=REV-EXP-CAP. In order to save space, its evolution is not investigated here, but can be inferred from the three variables discussed in
the paper.
5 Fluctuations in REV, as ratio to GDP, express changes in the tax burden, while movements in EXP are affected by its denominator due to
the low elasticity of expenditures to GDP. The elasticity of government net lending to GDP is therefore, by construction, intermediate
between that of REV and EXP.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 8
The latter two groups of countries constitute a sort of control group.  All in all, 16 countries
are considered in this paper. Luxembourg and Denmark are excluded from the sample because
comparable data are not available for all variables.
We use here two types of data sets.  The first data set, based on OECD annual data from the
June 1999 Economic Outlook database, are used because they provide consistent data for all the
16 countries in the sample for the 1970-1998 period. Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix
present the basic data. To illustrate the widening and/or narrowing of fiscal dispersion, each
country variable is plotted against the euro area average. The figures show that European
countries have been characterised by some convergence in the 1970s and until the early 1980s,
while following the second oil shock they have tended to diverge. They have, however, tended to
resume converging since the mid- to late 1980s, albeit with significant differences.
The second data set contains quarterly data, but only for a limited number of countries, namely
Germany, Spain, France and Italy for the period 1985.Q1 to 1997.Q4. The source is the
OECD Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle database for Germany and France,6 and National Central
Banks data for Spain and Italy. Quarterly data of a comparable quality was not available for the
other euro area countries. The quarterly data are consistent with the annual.
Before proceeding we need to briefly discuss the univariate time series properties of the data as
this will have a bearing on the specifications and interpretations of all the tests. Two types of tests
are performed.  The first test is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, where the
null hypothesis is that the series have a unit root (the results of the unit root and stationarity
tests are available upon request). This test indicates that most fiscal variables seem to have a unit
root, i.e., they are I(1). Further testing indicates no higher order of integration (i.e., there is no
evidence that the series are I(2) with only a few isolated exceptions).
We also perform the Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) stationarity tests, for which
the null hypothesis is that the series are stationary.  These tests indicate that, overall, these series
seem to be stationary for most countries, a result conflicting with the findings of the ADF tests.
In the case of NLG, we tend, however, to consider that KPSS provides the appropriate null, since
the government budget balance is an adjustment variable, which, from a theoretical standpoint, is
expected to be I(0).
There are diverse explanations for this apparent divergence between ADF and KPSS tests.  First,
the power of both tests is low due to the small size of the sample consisting of only 29 annual or
52 quarterly observations per variable.  Second, most series are likely to have breaks due to the
changes in policies that occurred in the sample period in most countries. All in all, it is commonly
perceived that ADF tests are more powerful than KPSS tests: hence, we are more inclined
to accept the hypothesis that the series have a unit root over the sample which we are
considering.  7
Similar results, as for the ADF tests on annual data, are found on quarterly data (for the period
1985.Q11997.Q4), with the exception of the general government public deficit, which is
stationary in Germany, while it may be taken as trend-stationary in France for the period under
review. It is more clearly I(1) in Italy, due to the major changes introduced in the countrys fiscal
policy in the 1990s. It might have been I(2), but another hypothesis, more realistic in our view, is
that the series were actually subject to regime shifts, i.e. that they were characterised by periods
6 These quarterly data were kindly made available from the OECD for this project (in the case of  France they are similar to the national
account figures from INSEE).
7 However, we also know that under normal circumstances fiscal variables do not meander around without boundaries as they are in fact
bound by the government budget constraints.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 9
of sharp increase or decrease . We pursue this hypothesis in Section 5 by studying the effect of
the introduction of broken trends (in particular to accommodate sudden shifts of the variables
in most countries at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s). In addition, a deterministic
trend is sometimes weakly significant on top of the existence of a unit root  (the level of the
series is therefore, in that case, the sum of a deterministic and a stochastic trend). This will be
reflected in the design of cointegration tests.
In summary, the view emerging from the above tests is that for the whole sample period NLG is
non-stationary using annual data, while it is stationary (sometimes with a drift) for quarterly
data on the period 1985.Q1 to 1997.Q4. For both types of data, EXP and REV seem to be
non-stationary. However, given the small sample size and the limitations of the tests, we cannot
completely exclude that in several countries the variables that we found to be non-stationary
also include a deterministic component. For example, the European process of economic
and financial integration might have fostered increasingly higher expenditure (and also revenue)
in those countries with fewer public infrastructures, a smaller provision of public goods, and
an initially lower standard of living (i.e., a public finance catching-up effect).
3 Stylised facts of fiscal policy
Our first approach to fiscal convergence among countries in the euro area is based on simple
descriptive tests. We compute first the contemporaneous cross-correlation between fiscal
indicators and then indicators of fiscal dispersion.
3.1 Indicators of cross-correlation
Our starting point is to calculate contemporaneous cross-correlation across fiscal variables as in
Artis and Zhang (1997) in the context of their study on EU business cycles synchronisation.  This
correlation tests measure the strength of the linear association between the selected fiscal
variables for each of the countries in the sample against the corresponding euro area weighted
average (using PPP adjusted GDP values in 1995). For euro area countries, the country is
excluded from the euro area average against which the correlation is computed in order to
reduce the bias that could be more significant for the larger economies. For the non-euro area
countries, i.e. the two control groups (respectively UK, Sweden and Greece, and the US, Japan,
and Canada), correlation is computed between these countries, on the one hand, and the whole
euro area, on the other hand.
Because the variables investigated seem to be non-stationary over the sample period we cannot
simply compute the correlation of the basic ratios to GDP as there would be an upward bias
in the correlation coefficient. Therefore, we concentrate on fiscal cycles. We calculate therefore
the correlation in first differences of the basic ratios to GDP (to correct for the I(1) problem)
and the correlation of cyclical differences with respect to trends to gauge the extent to
which national fiscal policies were altered with respect to underlying fiscal trends. The latter
are calculated as follows: for a given fiscal variable  )LW  in country i (e.g. government current
expenditures), the trend is defined as  a )LW , after smoothing with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
(using l =100 in this case). To reduce the end-point problem we used forecasts based on
the OECD June 1999 Economic Outlook. As in Artis and Zhang (1998) the cycle for all
variables, except government net lending (NLG), is defined as the ratio to the HP filtered
8 However, we also know that, under normal circumstances fiscal variables do not meander around without boundaries as they are bound
by the budget constraints.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 10
series:  F) ) ) LW LW LW LW =-  a a
. For NLG cyclical differences are obtained by subtracting
current observations from the trend because the presumed trend should gravitate toward zero.9
There are very few qualitative differences between the correlation indicators in first differences,
that are available upon request, and those in cyclical differences, shown here in Table 1. We also
distinguish between sub-periods in order to assess some additional elements about the changes
in fiscal co-movement over time. We follow Angeloni and Dedola (1999) in distinguishing
between:
1. the  pre-ERM sub-period from 1970 to 1978;
2. the soft-ERM sub-period from 1979 to 1985;
3. the hard-ERM sub-period from 1986 to 1992; and
4. the pre-EMU sub-period from 1993 to 1998.
Due to the small sample size of our data set, the confidence interval of cross-correlation in such
short sub-periods is effectively quite large (see unit standard deviation at the bottom of each
table).12  Hence, these values must be interpreted with a great deal of circumspection and taken
as simple indications of changes.  In order to reduce the confidence interval we also split the
sample period in two longer sub-periods: 1970-1985 and 1986-1998.
Concerning government net lending (NLG), the euro area average correlation exhibits a
significant and steady decline during 19701992 (from 0.63 in 19701978-which is significantly
different from zero- to 0.44 in 19791985, and 0.43 in 19861992) rebounding robustly only in
the last sub-period (to 0.79 in 19931998). Correlation for the countries in the other two
groups displays a more erratic path but also posts some significant increases in the last sub-
periods.  Overall, during 19861998 the correlation in the non-euro area and the others is in
most cases higher than for the euro area countries.
For total current revenue (REV) three remarks can be made. First, correlation across the euro
area rises over time, albeit unevenly but remaining below the correlation in NLG and EXP.
Second, during 19861998 the correlation coefficients are not significantly different from 0 for
the euro area as a whole. In particular, the correlation between France and Germany and other
euro area countries turns insignificant in the 19931998 period, while it is negative for Belgium.
Third, during 19861998 in almost all non-euro area countries the correlation with the euro
area weighted average declines and turns negative in most cases (e.g. the UK, which had a
significant positive correlation with the euro area during 197085 is negatively correlated during
198698), or becomes insignificant.
The correlation across indicators of current expenditure (EXP) is in most cases the highest
among the three fiscal variables being considered over the whole sample period. Three
developments stand out. The first one is that the correlation among euro area countries is clearly
on an upward trend,11 in particular because Spain becomes more correlated with the euro area
during the 19861998 period. The second development is that the dispersion in correlation
between euro area countries is also the most even among the variables considered (i.e., it shows
the smallest gap between the highest and the lowest correlation values).  The third is that there is
9 In the line of our previous remarks, deviation from trend in REV express discretionary changes in tax policies. For NLG and EXP, there is
a mixture of effects from the business cycle and fiscal policy. However, due to the lack of consensus in the literature on the proper way  to
compute cyclically adjusted variables, we focus, in this section, on headline fiscal indicators. OECD cyclically adjusted fiscal indicators will
only be investigated in Section 4, and we provide ways to correct, at least partially, for the euro area business cycle in Section 5.
10 These indicative standard deviations are obtained as                      and under the assumption that these variables are normally distributed
and not allowing for higher orders of dependence. The true standard deviations are likely to be larger.
Q 6’ ￿ ￿ =
11  When the two sub-periods 1970-1985 and 1986-1998 are compared, this is clear for the cyclical variations, while it is difficult to reject
the null hypothesis of constant average coefficient of correlation for the indicators in first difference.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 11
a remarkably high correlation of the UK and the US with the euro area average (during the
whole sample period), Canada (during 1986 and 1998), and Sweden (in the last sub-period).
In summary, the correlation in fiscal developments across the euro area is not always very high,
and in several cases it does not exceed that for several countries in the control groups, but it is
in most cases positive.  Furthermore, it has generally increased steadily over the sample period,
and more consistently during the 1993-98 sub-period (but often also during 1986-98).
Interestingly, the correlation in cyclical differences for the euro area during 1986-1998 are
generally higher than the correlation in first differences and often even the correlation in levels
(both of which are not shown here).  Instead, the correlation of several other countries in the
control groups exhibit swings across variables (e.g., during 1986-98 both the UK and the US
displayed very high positive correlation with the euro area for NLG and EXP, but negative
correlation for REV).
These preliminary findings support the hypothesis that convergence in terms of
contemporaneous linear association is developing within the euro area.  To understand if also the
underlying longer-term evolution of these selected fiscal variables is moving closer together we
will turn to the analysis of dispersion below, as well as, the cointegration tests in Section 4. The
correlation coefficients are of course affected by real convergence in terms of business cycles (in
particular for NLG and EXP). In Section 5, we will return to this issue and try to correct for
business cycle movements.
3.2 Indicators of Fiscal Dispersion
The second approach to obtain stylised facts is to compute standard deviations and coefficients
of variation (i.e. standard deviation normalised by the mean) of each fiscal variable across
countries. Fiscal variables are now taken as ratios to GDP, so that we measure the dispersion of
such ratios across countries. The benchmark for countries in the euro area, as well as, in the
control group is the euro area average. Formally, note that )LW
M  is the value of the fiscal
indicator i       L = in country j and at date t . Define Z as one of the group of countries
under study (i.e., euro-area countries, non-euro area EU countries, and other selected OECD
countries). The average level of the fiscal indicator i in the group Z (which includes n(Z) countries),











  .  The standard deviation to the euro area is the sum of the









= ) P )
= Q
W P
￿   
 






LW )P )    . In the case of NLG, we present only the standard deviation since the average is
usually close to zero. Notice that we use, at this stage, unweighted sums in order to capture the
dispersion across national entities and to avoid giving too much weight to the larger countries.
One additional reason for using unweighted averages is that weighted averages for the countries
in the control groups would have had very little economic sense: what meaning would the GDP
weighted fiscal dispersion for the US, Japan, and Canada have? In Sections 3 and 4, we introduce
PPP-weighted aggregates of the euro-zone .
In Figure 1 we plot the standard deviation    LW
= ) s  and the coefficient of variations to the euro area
for all three groups of countries. All charts clearly illustrate a sharper decline in fiscal dispersion
among the euro area countries than in the other two groups. 12  The decline in fiscal dispersion is
12 We check this result by also plotting the usual indicators of standard deviation and coefficient of variation.  In comparison to the
indicators presented here, the reference used for the control groups is the mean of the group instead of the euro area average. These
charts, that are not shown but are available upon request, confirm that fiscal dispersion declined more significantly across euro area
countries.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 12
more distinguishable for euro area countries in the case of current revenue and current
expenditure, and particularly after the onset of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS (i.e.,
supporting the disciplinary effect argument). In particular, there is a more significant decline in
fiscal dispersion across the euro area for current revenue (the coefficient of variation declined
from about 0.15 during 19701974 to 0.065 during 19921998) than for current expenditure
(that in terms of coefficient of variation declined from about 0.13 during 19701974 to 0.07
during 19921998). In the case of government net lending, but also of current revenue, the
decline in dispersion sets on in the early 1980s but is interrupted in 1985 and 19891990 by
some unevenness in fiscal adjustments among euro area countries and the aftermath of a cyclical
deterioration respectively.
In summary, the decline in fiscal dispersion indicates a strong support particularly for the
condition for convergence requiring that the variance of the relationship between selected
variables should decline toward, possibly, a constant value (or at least not grow over time). We
turn now to the more formal tests of convergence on trends and cycles.
4 Cointegration tests of convergence
As we saw in Section 2, the fiscal variables that we are using can be characterised as non-
stationary I(1) variables over the sample period under consideration. The hypothesis that we are
testing here is whether, at the international level, countries have jointly deviated from budget
balance, or have all returned simultaneously to equilibrium over a period of time, i.e., whether
fiscal indicators are cointegrated. As for the correlation indicators, we test pairwise cointegration,
running these tests on two variables at a time, e.g., a fiscal variable for a specific country and the
euro area average of the other countries for the same variable. For the countries outside the
euro area we simply compare the country to the euro area average. In addition, for all the
variables we run the tests on cyclically adjusted indicators in order to control for the existence
of common business cycles across the countries in the sample (but such data are only available
since 1974 and unfortunately not for all countries), and for simple ratios-to-GDP of the variables.
Two types of cointegration tests are now presented. They are the Equilibrium Correction Model
(ECM) cointegration test  that is also known as the error correction model  and the Johansen
cointegration test.13 In Tables 2, 3, and 4 we show the results of the tests using cyclically adjusted
variables, while  in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the annex we show the tests using the simple ratios
to GDP.
4.1 ECM and Johansen cointegration tests
The ECM tests, that we discuss first, are based on a two-step procedure, using the approach
proposed by Kremers et al. (1992). The results are in Columns 1 (Model) through 7 of Tables 2,
3, and 4. Let us consider a country j and an indicator i (e.g., NLG). First the long run equilibrium
is estimated on the basis of an unrestricted model in distributed lag form, which is solved
numerically.  Two specifications are investigated depending whether a deterministic trend is
included or not in the regression:
(4.1.a)                                                                         or
(4.1.b)
13 We also ran the Engle Granger cointegration tests with and without a time trend. As the results do not add much to the information from
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Column 1 in the table indicates the model that was selected to estimate the long run equilibrium
(i.e., a for eq. 4.1.a or b for eq. 4.1.b), the selection procedure is based on the significance of the
coefficient on the trend, using a Student t-test on b. 
M
LW ) is, as before, a given fiscal indicator in
country j, while 
HXUR M
LW )
￿ is the corresponding fiscal indicator for the euro area (a weighted
average excluding country j). The latter variable is assumed to be weakly exogeneous for the long
run parameters a, which means that fiscal policy in country i does not affect, in the long run, fiscal
policy in the other countries.14 Note that the   / a s are polynomials of the lag operator.
Applying a third order autoregressive lag model to our annual data,15 we use the lagged residual
M
W L ] ￿ ￿ -  as equilibrium correction term in the following ECM:
(4.1.c)
The ECM test is based on g, or its t-ratio. The critical values for this two-step test are given by
McKinnon (1992). The country results for the t-ratio appear in column ECM.  We also provide
the value of the DF test on the residual 
M
W L ] ￿ ￿ -  (column DF). The slope coefficient corresponds
to         ￿ ￿ a a  in the long-run equation (4.1.).






(1991) recommends a sequential testing procedure for which one starts with the strictest
specification for the null hypothesis, i.e., Hypothesis 1 below (zero cointegration relation) moving
to looser specifications with more cointegrating relations, i.e., Hypothesis 3. We restrict ourselves
here to testing only three competing hypothesis (excluding the hypothesis with quadratic time
trends and the most restrictive hypothesis of no intercept either in the cointegrating equation
nor in the associated VAR). Following Johansen (1995) the hypothesis that we test for are (see
Column Hypothesis):
Hypothesis 1:  Intercept (but no trend) in the cointegrating equation and no intercept in the
associated VAR.  This is the most restrictive among our three hypothesis. It postulates that the
variables have no linear trend and the only deterministic component is the intercept in the
cointegrating relation. This is assumption H*1(r) in Johansen (1995).
Hypothesis 2:  Intercept (but no trend) in the cointegrating equation and trend in the associated
VAR.  This hypothesis postulates that the variables have linear trends but the cointegration
relations have no trends. This is assumption H1(r) in Johansen (1995).
Hypothesis 3:  Intercept and trend in the cointegrating equation, and no trend in the associated
VAR. This is the less restrictive among our three hypothesis. It postulates that the cointegration
space has a linear trend, which means that we allow for trend stationary variables, and the
trend stationarity can either be for a single variable or an equilibrium relation.  This is assumption
+U
￿  in  Johansen (1995).
On the basis of the stationarity tests discussed in Section 2 we would prefer Hypothesis 1 for all
three variables. However, we cannot completely exclude that in several countries these variables
may also be affected by a deterministic trend, as the European process of economic and financial
integration has fostered increasingly higher expenditure, and revenue, in those countries with
fewer public infrastructures, and a smaller initial provision of public goods. This catch-up effect

















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
14 In practice, this implies that the equation for               is not necessary for the estimation of the long-run parameters.
15 We chose three lags as a reasonable compromise between a large number of lags and sufficient degree of freedom. The results are
however robust to the number of lags.
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In the right hand part of Table 2, 3 and 4, we report the trace and the lambda max tests for the
first model where the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 10% level. The relevant critical
values are based on Osterwald-Lenum (1992) using the small sample correction of the maximum
likelihood estimators proposed by Cheung and Lai (1993).  Regarding the number of lags, we
tried to minimise the bias induced by overparameterization (Lutkepohl, 1999) by choosing one
lag in the model in first difference (hence,  two lags in level). Such a choice is found to be optimal
on the basis of an Akaike test on an OLS regression of )LW
M on lags of )LW
HXUR , as well as )LW
HXUR on
lags of )LW
M . Furthermore, it must be noted that we accept the hypothesis of one cointegration
equation either when the L-Trace test rejects the null of rank=0, or when the L-Max test rejects
the null of r=0.
4.2 Results of the cointegration tests
Tables 2, 3 and 4 for the cyclically adjusted variables (as well as tables A1, A2 and A3 in the annex)
provide some evidence in favour of cointegration.  In several cases this evidence depends on the
type of indicator considered. To simplify the comparisons, in each table the results are
summarised in the first column with the name of the country: one star (*) indicates that there is
significant evidence of cointegration either from the ECM or from the Johansen test; two stars
(**) mean that both tests converge to conclude to the existence of cointegration.
4.2.1 Government net lending (NLG)
In the case of NLG, we find limited cointegration  for both the ECM and the Johansen tests.
Cointegration is accepted for a few small countries in the euro area such as Austria and Portugal
on a cyclically adjusted basis (Table 2) and Spain (Table A1).16 This is consistent with the visual
inspection of Figures A.1. Surprisingly, Sweden also turned out to be cointegrated with the euro
area, although the Swedish budget balance varies more widely (the slope coefficient is equal to
1.77). According to the Johansen test, cointegration is also accepted for the US after introduction
of a trend.
All in all there is no overwhelming evidence of cointegration for NLG. There are several possible
explanations for this result. One is that the NLG is a catch-all term and the countries in the
sample have adopted rather different fiscal strategies also in response to exogenous shocks.
Another possible explanation is that countries in the sample have started their fiscal adjustment
at different points in time. The impact of the changes in the Italian deficit during the last part of
the sample is a case in point. Given the relatively high weight of Italy (20.3%), the significant
downward adjustment of the deficit of that country introduces a trend in the euro area average
against which the countries are compared. Since most countries did not implement such a drastic
and concentrated policy, the hypothesis of cointegration is not supported by the data.
4.2.2 Government current receipts (REV)
There is more evidence of cointegration in the case of current government receipts (REV),
including Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. As expected, the
comparison of Table 3 and Table A.2 in the annex, does not reveal significant differences between
the cyclically adjusted current receipt variable (REVQ) and the unadjusted REV, with the
exception of the switch between Ireland (that is cointegrated in cyclically adjusted terms but not
in terms of ratio to GDP) and Italy (that is cointegrated in terms of ratio to GDP but not in
cyclically adjusted terms).17 For Austria and Portugal the distribution of the coefficients in the
16 In the case of Portugal, such a result may be driven by an unexplained spike in the cyclically adjusted balance for 1980.
17 Owing to the unit elasticity of government receipts to GDP in most countries.  See also Section 3 for details.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 15
long run model are not standard (although the estimator is super-convergent), but they are
illustrative of the underlying dynamics.18 During the period, both countries were converging to
the euro area: Portugal was converging from below the euro area (catching-up process) and
Austria from above. Table 3 reveals that the intercept for Portugal is negative, while the slope is
close to one and the deterministic trend is positive. Germany was also converging from above
the euro area average with a positive intercept and a slope coefficient smaller than one (see
introduction for the explanation of convergence patterns). Italy was converging from below at
very high speed with a slope coefficient of 3 (in Table A2). On the other hand, the Netherlands is
found to be cointegrated with the euro area but with a negative slope coefficient, contradicting
convergence. Canada exhibits evidence of international convergence in terms of cyclically
adjusted variables, with a positive intercept but a slope coefficient positive but smaller than one,
but not for the non corrected variables.
4.2.3 Government current expenditure (EXP)
In the case of government expenditure (EXP), Table 4 indicates that Austria, France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain are found to be cointegrated with their euro area counterpart. Austria, France and
Spain were converging from above (with positive intercepts of respectively 10.37, 7.37 and 18.49
percentage point) and slope coefficients below one (i.e., respectively 0.79, 0.91 and 0.46).19 Italy
was converging fast from below and a slope coefficient of 1.51.  Portugal is converging in terms of
Johansen cointegration in Table 4. It has a negative intercept, a slope well below one but a positive
trend for the ECM test. This country is clearly converging from below in terms of non-cyclically
adjusted series (Table A3). Germany is also found to be converging in terms of non-cyclically
adjusted series, although Figure A.3 reveals that current disbursements as percentage of GDP
which was above the euro area average from 1970 to 1984, and dipped below the euro average
in the second part of the sample period. The existence of a converging trend is accepted for
Finland only in terms non-cyclically adjusted series since the intercept is very high and the slope
coefficient is negative, but low in absolute values. Figure A.3 reveals that EXP in that country
experienced sharp movement in the 1990s.
In summary, what do the above cointegration tests tell us? They provide evidence supportive of
the convergence conditions in terms of cointegration as laid out in the introduction. This seems
to hold particularly for current revenue and expenditure, and especially for small countries like
Austria and Portugal. The more modest evidence of cointegration for government net lending
may be the result of differences in timing and speed in the fiscal adjustment process initiated in
the mid- to late 1980s in each country. In addition, failure to detect a stable cointegration relation
may be due to shifts in the cointegrating vector as some countries may have finally converged at
the end of the sample. But annual data are not sufficient to make proper statistical inference on
the second half of the sample. Quarterly data may therefore be more useful, as shown in
Section 5.
18 A fully modified estimator of Saikhonen or Philipps/Loretan (1992) type would be necessary.
19 It it is not possible to use the long run estimate from the ECM test to assess the form of convergence. In the case of France such a result
holds, although one can observe a divergence at the end of the sample (stability of the ratio of expend.-to-GDP in France and reduction
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5 Dynamic factor index model for the euro area fiscal policy
position
An extension of the tests presented so far is to consider whether euro area countries share not
only common trends but also common cycles. The intuition is the following. If fiscal policy in the
euro area has, to a certain extent converged, as examined in the previous sections, it should
exhibit some common patterns. It is therefore sensible to test whether the fiscal stance in a
given country includes both euro area components and national features.
In comparison with the preceding approach, we focus here on the stationary components.  We
use here quarterly data on the period 1985.Q1 to 1997.Q4 for Germany, Spain, France and Italy.
This is the only sample period for which consistent quarterly data are available for all four largest
economies in the euro area. We are therefore considering a shorter sample period (the last
twelve years, as opposed to the last twenty five years). A possible advantage of shorter time
series is that the tests focus on a period in which positive interactions and spillovers of fiscal
policies may be more significant. On the other hand, a difficult issue that we faced throughout the
paper is the unit root properties of the series. Since we consider a shorter sample, we are  not
able to assess the long run properties of the series. In order to get stationary series, and
consistently with our economic prior, we assume that the series are actually stationary but
experienced temporary shocks shifting upwards or downwards the level of the variables for a
short period. We correct those regime shifts using broken trends in order to get stationary
variables.20
We investigate here two specifications. In the first one, i.e. Model 1, all four countries are
compared together with equal weight, while in the second one, Model 2, each individual country
is compared to the PPP weighted average of the other 3 countries.
In order to uncover both the common and the idiosyncratic (i.e. country specific) components in
our key fiscal indicators across countries, we decompose fiscal data following the method
introduced by Stock-Watson (1991) to model coincident economic indicator, as well as by
Kuttner and Sbordone (1997) and Clark (1998) to study the dynamics of the US labour market.
Such a method provides an estimate of the relative variance of the two types of shocks. In
particular, the relative importance of common shock allows to assess the degree of fiscal
convergence. For that purpose, we assume that fiscal variables can be decomposed into two
components: aggregate (euro area-wide) shocks and national (idiosyncratic) shocks.
Formally, we assume that there exists a common shock Ct  which impacts on national fiscal
variables. Each variable )LW
M is also affected by idiosyncratic shocks  c W
M  and we posit  that:
(5.1.)
for  MQ = ,  where  n is the total number of countries (n=4 in the first variant). The vector
a
M  is called the vector of factor loadings on the common shock. Both types of  shocks are the
unobserved state variables of the system, noted as a n+1-dimensional vector
6& W W W QW =    
 c c ￿ .  All variables are measured as deviations from the unconditional mean.
We apply the Kalman filter to the system made of the state variables and the observation
equations (see Table 5). The common shock is assumed to follow an AR(2) process and the
idiosyncratic shock an AR(1):
20 On the period 1985.Q1-1997.Q4, most series exhibit a sharp increase in the late 1980s/early 1990s. NLG: Italy exhibit a very significant
upward trend ; REV: 1994-1996 for France, 1990-1992 for Spain, 1989-1992(increase) and 1992-1995(slowdown) for Italy ; EXP: 1991-
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(5.2)
(5.3.)
() 'WW WQ W = we e      
 ￿  are the innovations to the state variables. The innovations are assumed to
be orthogonal:(' ' G L D J 
    = ss w e
￿ ￿ , with                  the variance-covariance matrix of the
innovations on the idiosyncratic shocks. The observation equations are  )$ 6 WW = , where
[] $D D D , G QQ =    
 ￿￿ . Finally, the system is correctly identified if the standard deviation
of the common shock is known, and we chose s w = , which is a pure normalisation.21
It is possible to compute the contribution of the common shock to the variance of the observed
variables. This is a measure of convergence. For that purpose, note that, given the assumed
orthogonality between the innovations on the common and the idiosyncratic shocks, the variance
of a given fiscal indicator is:
(5.4.)
The specification used in the second variant, i.e. Model 2, is to determine which countries are
closely associated with the euro area aggregate (Table 6). In that case, the dynamic factor model
is reduced to n=2.
5.1 Common cyclical components across the largest euro area countries
The first experiment considers the four largest euro area countries and decomposes their
dynamics between common and idiosyncratic shocks. For NLG, Table 5 reports rather
satisfactory results, since the factor loadings on the common shock are significant for all four
countries: Germany (with a coefficient of 0.27), France (0.56) and Italy (0.32) and Spain (0.23).
The common shock follows a stationary AR(2) process for which the first lag is significant (see
the b coefficients). The idiosyncratic components also has a well behaved (i.e. stationary) AR(1)
structure, where the g coefficients are significant in all countries but France. The magnitude of the
standard deviation of the innovation to the national component (the s coefficients) is similar to
the one of the common component: as compared to the reference value of one for the common
component, we find 1.06 in Germany, 0.47 in France, 0.77 in Italy and 0.83 in Spain. The large
adjustment in the Italian public finances explain the particular path followed by that country with
a larger weight of the idiosyncratic component (which is quite persistent with an AR term of
0.87). Table 7 reveals that the common shock contribute to most of the variance of NLG for
France, but only 45% in Italy and 48% in Spain. Notice that that results are quite robust since the
s coefficients are accurately measured (and their standard deviation is quite small). On the other
hand the standard deviation is relatively higher for the a and g coefficients.
One caveat is that we may uncover the effect of the euro area business cycle, given the
sensitiveness of the fiscal deficit to the business cycle, as observed in Section 4. However, it
appears that, when controlling for the euro-area business cycle, there is still evidence of
comovements in government net lending.22 This is apparent from the top chart of Figure 2, where
W W W W & & & w b b + + = - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿









21 We do not address the issue of extracting the mean of the common shock and our normalisation is therefore consistent with Stock-
Watson (1991). This is different from the identification chosen by Le Bihan and Sédillot (1999), which in another context, set the 
M a s to
be equal to 1 in order to constrain the unconditional mean of the state variable (core inflation, in their case) to have the same mean as
actual inflation. Such an identification assumption would be necessary if we wanted to derive an indicator of the level of the euro area
fiscal stance and not only of its cyclical changes.
22 To control for the euro area business cycle, we computed a weighted average of GDP in the four countries under review (using PPP
weights). Deviation from the HP filter trend was taken as an indicator of the short term (or cyclical) component of the euro area GDP.  We
first regressed net government lending for each country on this indicator, which did exhibit significant coefficients in France and Spain.
Then, we applied the same procedure as described for Model 1 to the residuals of the first-step regressions.
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
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we plot the fiscal indicator for each country and the implied common factor (in bold line).23 It
also appears that the common state variable is highly correlated with the observed value for
NLG in France, while the indicator for Spain is much more volatile and the one for Germany
exhibits divergences during a few sub-periods.24
Regarding REV and EXP, there is some evidence of comovements. France again plays a significant
role in the dynamics of the common shock on REV, which contributes to 48% of total variance
for the observed variable, but almost zero for the other countries. Regarding EXP, there is
evidence of comovement between France and Italy: the factor loading on the common shock is
significant. The common shock, which mixes features of these two countries, contributes to 7% of
the variance in France and 23% in Italy. The point estimate for Spain (37%) should be seen in
relation to its high standard error. Looking at Figure 2, it is difficult to interpret the common
shock (middle and bottom charts).
All in all, this sub-section indicates that the four largest euro area countries share common cycles
for the ratio of public deficit to GDP, as well as between France and the Italian cycle for EXP.
There is apparently less comovement between the four countries for REV.
5.2 Common cycles with euro area indicators
Our second experiment is designed to compare each individual country to the weighted
aggregate of the three other countries. In the following, we refer to the latter indicator as
« euro ». As indicated before we consider bivariate models and investigate whether there is a
common component between the two variables.
As indicated in Table 6, we get similar results to those in Table 5. For the NLG indicators,25 the
French and Italian models are supported by the data (the factor loadings are statistically
significant), indicating the existence of common cycle between these two countries and the euro
area. The contribution of the common shock to the variance of the country and the euro
aggregate is above 70% in France and Italy (Table 7). This confirms the findings of the previous
Section.  For REV and EXP it appears difficult to uncover common components for a given
country and its euro area counterpart. In Table 6, the common factor expresses only one of the
two variables, not both. This is confirmed by the decomposition of variance.
In summary, the Kalman Filter allows to uncover common components across fiscal policies in
core euro countries. However, this is more significant regarding government net lending, which
exhibit common cycles across countries. For revenues and expenditures, there is very little
evidence of common cycles. Regarding the interpretation of the results, one should stress, that
while we uncovered common factors, there is also evidence that, in the case of net lending, the
common shock does not simply reflect the euro area business cycle, but refers to a common
fiscal policy.26 Although the method is different from the indicators of cross-correlation presented
in Section 3, since we do not account for the trend in a similar way, it is possible to note that the
results are quite consistent for NLG and REV (evidence of comovements in the first case,
whereas some countries may diverge for the latter variable, so that we tend to reject common
fiscal cycles for REV).
23 The country indicators for NLG are the residuals from the first-step regression described in the preceding footnote, while in the case of
REV and EXP they are just the centered indicators.
24 Note that the variability of the common shock derives from the assumption made on w s .  The model actually identifies ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
W
M & 9DU a ,  so
that reducing the variance of  W &  amounts to increasing 
M a , as indicated in equation (5.4.).
25 In order to correct for the effect of the trend in Italy, all NLG variables (and in particular the euro area aggregates) are corrected for their
deterministic trend. The only exception is Germany.
26 As already discussed, the ratio of current revenue to GDP is, by construction, and due to the unit elasticity of revenues, corrected for the
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6 Conclusion
This paper set out to assess whether the euro area is characterised by some convergence in
fiscal policies by examining the correlation, dispersion and cointegration of government net
lending, total current revenue, and total current expenditure: three variables that are affected by
the European process of integration.
The contemporaneous cross-correlation for all three variables is not always very high but is
generally positive. Furthermore, it has generally increased steadily over the sample period, and
particularly in the latter part. In addition, the dispersion in cross-correlation among euro area
countries is also gradually declining over time above all for government net lending and total
current expenditure.  We also find convincing evidence that fiscal dispersion has been declining
for all three variables at a sustained pace among all countries in the sample, but particularly
among euro area countries.
Using annual data we find some evidence of cointegration across the euro area for total current
revenue and also  but less significantly  for total current expenditure. Cointegration on the
revenue side is consistent with the process of tax harmonisation in several areas most exposed
to competition, the gradual synchronisation of fiscal policies also in response to more
synchronised business cycles, and in the latter part of the sample period with the fulfilment of
the Maastricht convergence criteria.  The limited cointegration on the expenditure side can be
explained, amongst others, with a catch up process in several low expenditure countries.  Less
cointegration, is found instead for government net lending.  This does not necessarily indicate a
lack of convergence that is detectable from the raw data and is underpinned by the indicators of
fiscal dispersion. It may instead result from differences in timing and speed in the fiscal adjustment
process in each country.  All in all, these findings are significant also because the sample period
that we investigate is characterised by many far-reaching economic and institutional changes, and
also shifts in the thrust of fiscal policy across each country.
Empirical work using higher frequency (i.e., quarterly) public finance data is greatly constrained by
the lack of consistent and reliable data. We needed to restrict ourselves to examining only the
four largest euro area countries and starting in 1985. However, the investigated variables did not
behave in the same way. Government net lending, which was at the centre of the rush to EMU
and among the most scrutinised variables, share common cyclical factors across countries: i.e.,
they were interlinked. On the other hand, cycles in revenues and expenditures are rarely
interlinked.
The above tests, jointly interpreted, tend to indicate that although fiscal policy in euro area
countries has significantly converged, country-specific components still contribute to a significant
share of the variability of the aggregate.  Furthermore, additional investigation is needed for the
sub-components of these variables that could be more affected by the ongoing economic and
financial changes. On the other hand, we have not accounted for different levels in public
indebtedness that may be reducing the ability (or opportunities) for further fiscal convergence in
flow variables in some countries.
In our analysis we controlled for the effects of increasing synchronisation in business cycles to
the extent possible. However, this could not be systematic, in particular because there is, as yet,
no consensus regarding the proper way to compute cyclically adjusted indicators and to model
jointly the economy and budgetary policy. This is an area though in which further research is
needed.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 20ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 21
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(XUR￿$UHD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿:HLJKWHG￿$YHUDJH￿
8QLWHG￿.LQJGRP ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6ZHGHQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
’HQPDUN ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
*UHHFH￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
8QLWHG￿6WDWHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
-DSDQ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&DQDGD ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿




Sources: OECD June 1999 Economic Outlook (EO) and authors' calculations.
1  Correlations with respect to euro area weighted averages (PPP adjusted GDP values in 1995). For euro area countries the country is
excluded from the average against which the correlation is computed and weights are re-scaled. Comparable data for Denmark and
Luxembourg were not  available. Cyclical differences are obtained by subtracting current observations from the trend obtained by applying
the Hodrick Prescott filter with lambda = 100.
 Tables and charts
 Table 1
Contemporaneous Correlations in Cyclical Diferences with respect to Euro Area Average,
197019981ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 25
 Table 2
ECM and Johansen Cointegration Tests, Net Lending Government Cyclically Adjusted
(NLGQ), 19741998
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$XVWULD￿￿ E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
%HOJLXP 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
)LQODQG 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
)UDQFH E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
*HUPDQ\ E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,UHODQG E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 1$ 1$ 1$
,WDO\ E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
1HWKHUODQGV E ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
3RUWXJDO￿ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
6SDLQ E ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
8QLWHG￿.LQJGRP 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
6ZHGHQ￿ E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 1$ 1$ 1$
*UHHFH E ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
86$ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
-DSDQ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&DQDGD E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&ULWLFDO￿YDOXHV￿￿-RKDQVHQ￿￿￿￿￿OHYHO￿￿ZLWK￿&KHXQJ￿￿ ￿+\SRWK￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
DQG￿/DL￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿FRUUHFWLRQ￿￿￿ ￿+\SRWK￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿+\SRWK￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ /
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Source: OECD and authors calculations.
1 Critical values for ECM: model (a) with intercept and trend : 10% -3,50 (*); 5% -3,78 *; 1% -4,33 **, and model (b) with intercept only:
10% -3,04 (*); 5% -3,33 *; 1% -3,90 **.  In ECM  Test, column DF is the value of the Dickey Fuller test on the residuals of the long run
regression.
2 Johansen cointegration tests between the country specific selected fiscal variables and the Euro Area averages.  E.g., the cointegration
between NLG  for Austria and euro area average NLG excluding Austria.  The (*) means significant at 10 percent level, * at 5 percent level
and ** at 1 percent level.
3 Hypothesis 1: Intercept (and no trend) in the cointegrating equation and no intercept in the associated  VAR. This is the most restrictive
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Intercept (and no trend) in the cointegrating equation and in the associated  VAR.
Hypothesis 3: Intercept and trend in the cointegrating equation, and no trend in the associated  VAR.  This is the less  restrictive among our
three hypothesis.
4 Two lags in level are used for all tests: this is also consistent with the Akaike statistics for most countries.
5 The series are cointegrated if the number of cointegrating equat. is 1. They are not cointegrated if r=0, and they are supposedly stationary
if r=2.
6 Due to the small sample size we use the correction factor of the standard Johansen critical values that is suggested for tests on finite
sample sizes by Cheung and Lai (1993): the scaling factor of the standard critical values is SF=no.observ./(no.observ.-no. variables*lags).ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 26
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%HOJLXP 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
)LQODQG 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
)UDQFH E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
*HUPDQ\￿ E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
,UHODQG￿ D ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,WDO\ E ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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6SDLQ D ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
8QLWHG￿.LQJGRP 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
6ZHGHQ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$ 1$
*UHHFH D ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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ECM and Johansen Cointegration Tests, Total Current Revenue Cyclically Adjusted
(REVQ), 19741998
(see footnotes and explanations on Table 2)
Source: OECD and authors calculations.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 27
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,UHODQG ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 1$ 1$ 1$
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&DQDGD ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ /
￿ ￿ ￿ 0





ECM and Johansen Cointegration Tests, Total Current Expenditure Cyclically Adjusted
(EXPQ), 19741998
(see footnotes and explanations on Table 2)
Source: OECD and authors calculations.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 28
 Table 5
Model 1: Four Largest Euro Area Countries, 1985: 11997:41,2
(see footnotes and explanations on Table 2)
Sources: OECD Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle Database, Central Banks of Italy and Spain, and authors calculations.
1 Kalman filter estimates of model where the state variables are the common shock and the four idiosyncratic components, the vector of
observation equations is made of the fiscal indicator for the four countries (see section 6.1). The * means significant at 10 percent level,
** at 5 percent level and *** at 1 percent level.
2 1985:11997:4 is the only sample period for which quarterly data are available for all four largest economies in the euro area.
3 Based on the evidence of stationarity (for NLG) or the possibility that the series may be not stationary but cointegrated (for YPG and YRG).
4 Based on the possibility that YPG and YRG are not stationary, the  series are corrected for deterministic trends on subperiods (usually the
period 1988-1991).
&RHII￿ ￿6WDQGDUG￿(UURU￿ &RHII￿ ￿6WDQGDUG￿(UURU￿ &RHII￿ ￿6WDQGDUG￿(UURU￿
&RPPRQ￿6KRFN￿￿&W￿
)DFWRU￿/RDGLQJ
a￿*(5￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
a￿)5$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
a￿,7$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
a￿63$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
&RHII￿￿RI￿$5￿￿￿￿3URFHVV
b1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
b￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
,GLRV\QFUDWLF￿6KRFN￿￿;W￿
&RHII￿￿RI￿$5￿￿￿￿3URFHVV
g￿*(5￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
g￿)5$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
g￿,7$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
g￿63$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
6WDQGDUG￿’HYLDWLRQV
s￿*(5￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
s￿)5$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
s￿,7$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
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 Table 6
Model 2: National Components versus Euro Area Factor, 1985:1  1997:41
Sources: OECD Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle Database, Central Banks of Italy and Spain, and authors calculations.
1 Kalman Filter estimates of bivariate models where the state vector includes the common shock and the 2 idiosyncratic components (the
country under study and the euro area aggregate excluding that country), and the observation vector is made of the fiscal indicator for the
country under study and the euro area aggregate excluding that country (see section 6.2). * means that the coefficient is significant at the
10% level. ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
2 NLG in level assuming the variables are stationary (only Italian figures are corrected for their trend).
3  YRG and YPG are taken in level, after correction for the deterministic trends appearing in 19881991.
&RPPRQ￿IDFWRU ,GLRV\QFUDWLF￿FRPSRQHQWV
)DFWRU￿ORDGLQJV $5￿￿￿￿FRHIILFLHQWV $5￿￿￿￿FRHIILFLHQWV 6WDQGDUG￿GHYLDWLRQ
a￿￿M￿ ￿￿a￿￿HXUR￿ b￿ b￿ d￿￿M￿ ￿￿d￿￿HXUR￿ s￿M￿ ￿￿s￿HXUR￿
1HW￿/HQGLQJ￿￿*RYHUQPHQW￿￿1/*￿￿￿
￿
*(5 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
)5$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,7$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
63$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&XUUHQW￿5HYHQXHV￿￿<5*￿￿
￿
*(5 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
)5$ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
,7$ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
63$ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
&XUUHQW￿([SHQGLWXUHV￿￿<3*￿￿
￿
*(5 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
)5$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,7$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿VWDQGDUG￿HUURU￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
63$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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 Table 7
Contribution of Common Shocks to Total Variance of Fiscal Indicator, 1985:1  1997:41
(Percent of total: 1=100%)
Sources: OECD Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle Database, Central Banks of Italy and Spain, and authors calculations.
1 On the basis of the decomposition of variance between the common shock and the idiosyncratic shocks from tables 5 and 6.
2 Model with the four largest euro area countries.
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*(5 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
)5$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,7$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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$XVWULD E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
%HOJLXP D ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
)LQODQG D ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
)UDQFH D ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
*HUPDQ\ E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,UHODQG D ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
,WDO\ D ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
1HWKHUODQGV E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
3RUWXJDO E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
6SDLQ￿ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
8QLWHG￿.LQJGRP E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
6ZHGHQ￿ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
*UHHFH D ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
86$￿ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
-DSDQ E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&DQDGD E ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&ULWLFDO￿YDOXHV￿￿-RKDQVHQ￿￿￿￿￿OHYHO￿￿ZLWK￿&KHXQJ￿ ￿+\SRWK￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
DQG￿/DL￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿FRUUHFWLRQ￿￿￿￿ ￿+\SRWK￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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 Table A1
ECM and Johansen Cointegration Tests, Net Lending Government (NLG), 19701998
(see  footnotes and explanation in Table 2)
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ECM and Johansen Cointegration Tests, Total Current Revenue (REV), 19701998
(see  footnotes and explanation in Table 2)
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ECM and Johansen Cointegration Tests, Total Current Expenditure (EXP), 19701998
(see  footnotes and explanation in Table 2)
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 Figure 1
Selected Indicators of Fiscal Dispersion, 19701998
Standard Deviation with respect to the Euro Area
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Coefficient of Variations with respect to the Euro Area
Source: OECD June 1999 Economic Outlook and authors calculations.
Note: Average standard deviation and coefficient of variation (i.e., the standard deviation normalised by the mean) with respect to euro area
average for three groups of countries: euro area countries (excluding Luxembourg for which comparable data were not available): EU non-euro
area countries (i.e., the UK, Sweden and Greece but excluding Denmark for which comparable data were not available): and some selected
non-EU countries (i.e. the US, Japan and Canada). Simple unweighted averages are shown. Euro area averages for euro area countries exclude
the specific country for which the indicator of fiscal dispersion is calculated.
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 Figure 2
Common Cyclical Positions in Selected Euro Area Countries, 1985Q11997Q4
Government Net Lending (NLG)
Total Current Revenue (REV)
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 Figures A.1
Government Net Lending  Country Developments versus Euro Area Average, 19701998
(as percentage of GDP)
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Source: OECD June 1999 Economic Outlook and authors calculations.ECB Working Paper No 20 l  May 2000 37










Euro area average excluding Spain
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 Figures A.3
Government Current Disbursements  Country Developments versus Euro Area Average,
19701998
(as percentage of GDP)
Source: OECD June 1999 Economic Outlook and authors calculations.
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Source: OECD June 1999 Economic Outlook and authors calculations.
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